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Abstract
This thesis aims to not only illustrate a metaphysical position, but also explore a possible
metaethical scheme which can be grounded therein. First is offered an outline of the core principles
of Process metaphysics. Then the author differentiates their own take on these principles, bringing
into dialogue several other philosophers, both within the tradition of Process philosophy and
outside of it. Next is explored the way in which this scheme can inform issues in other domains of
inquiry relevant to the final issue being addressed, which is metaethics. Though it is found that
this scheme can support at least a few different metaethical positions, one in particular is chosen
to illustrate how Process metaphysics can inform how the issues surrounding metaethics are
framed and analyzed.
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Prologue
To the Layman
The field of philosophy is in the curious position of being yet another highly technical field
with all of the jargon associated therewith, while still attempting to be accessible to all. After all,
one cannot choose not to have beliefs and a worldview, if one is going to live one’s life. Everyone
must be a philosopher, in some sense of the word. Still, often the jargon and the debates – which
all too often end up in the weeds of details and nitpicks – will put many off from the study
altogether. This prologue will be an attempt to explain this thesis to the layperson who happens
upon it.
Metaphysics is the field of study within philosophy that deals with the nature of existence
itself. Some relevant metaphysical questions might be: What is the nature of time? Of space? What
are things, events, or relations? What is causation? How does our conscious experience fit into a
world of physical stuff that science describes? Metaphysics therefore deals with questions which
cannot necessarily be directly addressed by something like empirical science.
The questions I focus on in this paper are the first one and also the last two. I situate myself
in a long tradition of thought now known as Process philosophy. The metaphysics espoused therein
is known as Process metaphysics. Process metaphysics unites all three concepts into one
framework. Time, causation, and a sort of proto-conscious-experience are united in one single
metaphysical structure. How can this be? Process metaphysics submits that at bottom, all reality
is composed of events. These events have structure, but everything – substance, form, laws of
nature, etc. – are the way they are because these events happen the way they do. The events
therefore have structure, and this structure is of what all else in Process philosophy is borne out.
This structure takes the following form: Each event is said to have three “phases”. The first is
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prehension. This is the proto-conscious-experience mentioned earlier. The event perceptively
assimilates other events. This is indeed a pseudo-mental phenomenon. Consider consciousness
with everything “thought-related” stripped away such that one is left with pure experience. This is
what is being conceived of here. The second phase is self-determination. This is where
spontaneous creativity is instantiated in reality, and also why time is the way it is, for the second
phase differentiates the present from the past, and makes real, dynamic change possible. The third
phase is concrescence, which is simply a “physicalization” of the event, allowing it to enter into
other events’ prehensions. This “entering into” is the nature of causation, as, in virtue of how the
next event prehends the previous one’s concresced form, cause and effect can have an
understandable internal link through time. So for an event to concresce just is for that event to
affect the future. Moreover, for an event to prehend others just is for it to experience them. And
finally, for an event to concresce just is for it to be in the past. In this metaphysics, the relations of
past-future, cause-effect, and object-subject collapse into a single relation. The past is cause is
objective. The future is effect is subjective.
This may be a lot to take in, and we seemingly have no real reason as of yet to believe it is
true. So what is the method by which a metaphysical scheme is “tested”? The only way a
philosopher knows to test something: ask questions – specifically, famous ones that philosophers
have wrestled with for centuries. Process metaphysics gives satisfactory answers to many famous
problems, the first of which is how consciousness could exist in a world of physical stuff. The
answer, of course, is that all reality contains extremely basic or “watered-down” experience of a
sort, and so when this is combined in an extremely complex nexus of causal structure like the brain,
one would expect on our metaphysics that what accompanies this is an extremely complex nexus
of experience as well. The thesis itself delves into many other philosophical problems that Process
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philosophy solves, but even a summary of those would require a significant amount of setup and
discussion, which I will leave for the larger work to properly spell out.
So let us move on to the third and final section: metaethics. Metaethics is the field of
philosophy dealing with the very nature of moral value. That is, what does “good” even mean? Is
it a meaningless property? Is it perhaps created by each individual person? Societies? Humanity
as a whole? Or perhaps the good is transcendent, within the realm of Forms, or even in the mind
and nature of God. These are metaethical issues. So what could Process metaphysics have to say
about metaethics? I argue that Process metaphysics actually supports quite a few metaethical
positions. My reasoning in that section begins by bracketing what is most supported by this scheme,
however. On the fundamental realists’ side, I argue that since Process philosophy is essentially
relational in nature, the good will also need to refer to some aspect of dynamic, relational structure
involving humans. This means the good cannot be so transcendentally realist that it has no
contingency upon humanity. Secondly, I argue that once we have cornered ethics into pertaining
to action, and our statements regarding it are shown to be extremely similar to those regarding
other domains, it becomes best thought of as realist and neither antirealist nor simply based on
emotional expression. To be sure, the number of different metaethical positions that fit within these
boundaries (realism and some contingency upon humanity) is still quite large. However, I argue
that the Sensibility theory of McDowell and others comes the closest out of the different
metaphysical theories that I have explored.
Sensibility theory claims that morality involves a certain sensibility of the mind, somewhat
like humor, wherein that part of a developed human mind will respond in kind to an event which
is moral or immoral. It is of course possible to be wrong about the overall moral value of an event,
meaning that either one’s moral sensibility is underdeveloped or undeveloped, or that one is
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reacting to a smaller feature of that event rather than the entire event as a whole. But what does
this have to do with Process metaphysics? Many a philosopher has criticized Sensibility theories
of moral value for being circular. That is, if a sensibility of the mind is a moral sensibility simply
because it discerns moral value in the world, then moral value is now transcendentally real.
However, if some property in the world is moral value simply because the human moral sensibility
discerns it, then moral value is now entirely subjective. Process philosophy gives the most
satisfactory rejoinder to this critique, by pointing out that this question of the relative priority of
mind and world is in the same vein as the debate over consciousness and physical stuff. Whereas
the latter asked how physical stuff and consciousness could interact and make sense together, this
dilemma asks how a happening in the world and a sensibility of human mind could interact and
make sense together. The answer is the same in both contexts: the two things should not be
considered isolated phenomena at all, but rather two sides of a relation. The relation itself is what
makes the two things what they are. The relation of events to one another is what makes both the
physical world and consciousness possible, at once. The relation of human moral sensibility to
moral value out in the world is what makes either concept possible as well. This relation of course
takes on the character of Process and completes the rough sketch of what a metaethics grounded
in a simplified process metaphysics could be like.
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Chapter I.
An Overview and Brief Defense of Process Metaphysics

The criticisms of philosophers throughout the centuries on the futility of metaphysical
theorizing1 are to be taken as seriously now as ever. However, as debates escalate regarding what
the findings of fundamental physics tell us about our reality, and deeper solutions to the hard
problem of consciousness are explored, metaphysics remains a domain of philosophical inquiry
which is alive and well. For now, I will choose to undertake an exercise in speculative metaphysics,
putting aside those criticisms which target metaphysical theorizing simplicitur. Of all of those in
recorded history who have taken this same road, those who fit into the broad camp known as
Process philosophy 2 are, I argue, closer to an all-encompassing metaphysical theory than any
others.
Causation vs Experience
Let us start with one of the most often discussed metaphysical questions: What is
causation? The metaphysical basis for causal connection is analyzed differently by any number of
philosophers, who offer such explanations as “nomological subsumption” (Jaegwon Kim),
“counterfactual dependence” (David Lewis), and “property transference” (Max Kistler). Others
have hinted at or endorsed eliminativism regarding causation (Russell, Quine). Even the temporal
directionality of causation has been called into question in recent years, wherein “the coincidence
of the causal and temporal orders is merely a contingent feature of the actual world” (Jonathan

1

The best example being the Logical Positivists, though figures such as Hume and Kant have spoken on this as well.
I will hereafter capitalize Process when I mean the philosophy or metaphysical scheme, to distinguish between this
and the word used in common parlance.
2
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Schaffer)3. Keeping all of this in mind, I want to argue that causation is in fact far simpler, and far
more universal, than these and other myriad positions in the contemporary literature of
metaphysics of causation make out.
I submit three observations here: First, there exists a far more basic type of experience
beneath what most people, and even many a philosopher, conceive of as “consciousness”. Second,
this experience and the physical world are causally connected. That is, an account of causal
connection cannot exclude basic experience. Third, our common-sense conception of causation
involves a relation between events where the former event “instructs” the latter as to how to occur,
and/or where the latter event “takes into account” the former event when manifesting. The first
observation demands some support, though most would leave it uncontested. The arguments of
the eliminativists regarding what is meant by experience are relevant and worth closer scrutiny,
but for now I will table that discussion until I expound upon it in Chapter 2. I am arguing here
instead against those who would suppose that experience comes with any number of complex
characteristics, such as thought, a self, etc. 4 : There exists a more basic type of experience,
disconnected from any unified self, and lacking intentional thought. The event and processes
thereon characterized by this type of experience I will term “experiential impingement”. A few
examples might be the experience of coming to or being drugged to the point of ego-death. Neither
necessarily correlate with rational thought, a coherent self, or any other characteristic of “mind”
as a classical dualist might conceive of it. We can certainly conceive of less cognitively developed
animals as possessing vast arrays of such experience, without a complex consciousness to speak

3
4

All these quotes from [1]
Such as classical dualists, whether the substance type or the property type, for instance
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of. At bottom, all consciousness includes basic experience, but certainly basic experience need not
be accompanied by a unified consciousness5.
The second observation needs support as well. Why must the hard problem of
consciousness6 necessarily be one about causation? First, the hard problem is usually put forth as
a causal problem – “How could goings on in the physical world cause our vivid experience?”.
Second, the immediate issue of the “meta-problem”7 arises: If conscious experience (as a real
phenomenon rather than merely a concept) is not part of any causal chain, then it cannot be part of
the causal chain that results in speech regarding it. Put another way, it cannot then be a meaningful
semantic referent8. And so, any theory which neglects to explain the causal connection of the
experiential and the physical becomes meaningless. Somehow experience must play a causal role,
at least with regards to the brain, if we are to make sense when discussing it as a real phenomenon.
The third observation is merely a commentary on how most people intuitively conceive of
causation – as a former event actively determining how a latter one manifests. It does not purport
to do any explanatory work – however, if my proposed theory ends up giving credibility to
common sense, this is ostensibly an explanatory virtue concerning its plausibility, compared to
one that would have us reject common sense in favor of an unintuitive conclusion, ceteris paribus.

Such an idea, that a more basic form of experience reaches into “lower” levels of reality, is represented quite well
among Eastern philosophical traditions. For instance, in Buddhism, there exist many different terms to refer to
different qualities of experience which constitute a significant part of fundamental ontology.
6
The hard problem in philosophy of mind is a problem coined by philosopher David Chalmers which goes as follows:
Science claims to give us a complete picture of reality by giving physical descriptions of things and their goings-on.
However, how is it that such a world results in the phenomenal experience of what it’s like to be something or
someone? How can a physical world give rise to experiential phenomena? In Chalmers’ own words: “Why should
physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?” [2].
7
Also coined by Chalmers [3]
8
Again, one could give a coherent explanation about a meaningful semantic referent that isn’t a “real” phenomenon,
such as, for example, “God” being a meaningful semantic referent as the personification of the ideal good, even though
God himself may not really exist. Here I mean to say that the meta-problem arises if one attempts to posit that
consciousness is a real phenomenon, but also that it does not play a causal role.
5
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A Simplified Process Metaphysics
Keeping in mind these three observations, and the overarching consideration of the
metaphysical basis for causal connection, I will now give a brief introduction to the father of
modern Process philosophy, Alfred North Whitehead. It is his detailed metaphysical scheme –
built on an ontology, semantics, and epistemology derived fundamentally from a notion of process
and event which are conceived of as metaphysical primitives – that I will now borrow from, though
not wholesale. I will take a speculative turn here and see how the resultant theorizing pans out
when critiqued metaphysically and then applied to different domains of inquiry. In Process and
Reality [4], Whitehead submits the notion of an ontological primitive called the “actual occasion”
– a structured event. Process philosophy implies therefore an event-based ontology rather than a
thing- or substance-based ontology. The actual occasion consists of three “phases”. The first is
prehension. In prehension, the event perceptively assimilates immediately past events. This is
clearly analogical to experience. The second is self-determination. This is what distinguishes the
event from the past. The third is concrescence. Concrescence “physicalizes” the event and allows
it to enter into other events’ prehensions. This “entering into” is an analog to causation. All of
reality is grounded in such actual occasions – in the “ether of events”, a complex, relational,
dynamic structure.
This is a simplification of Process metaphysics, but a simplification that I nonetheless take
to be able to do the bulk of the explanatory work when solving the problems that I will claim that
it solves. Whitehead’s own metaphysical scheme was much more eloquent, with eight different
ontological categories, of which actual occasions were only one, though they were the most
fundamental. I contrast my position from much of Process philosophical literature here by claiming
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that this simplified (and perhaps more tendentious) scheme possesses explanatory power adequate
to solve the problems I am setting out to solve.
So, what are some ramifications of this simplified Process metaphysics? The most
important ramification is that the relation between actual occasions – the relation wherein an actual
occasion prehends concresced events – is one of experience, causation, and time at once. Or, said
better, the relations between actual occasions in this metaphysics is the grounding for all three
concepts at once. More precisely, I am arguing that the cause-effect relation, the subject-object
relation, and the past-future relation are fundamentally the same, grounded in this metaphysics of
Process. To be a cause just is to be physical just is to be in the past. To be affected just is to
experience just is to move into the future. Why is this? Under this scheme, concresced events are
what are prehended in the first phase of any actual occasion. To be concresced is to be able to be
prehended at all. Likewise, concresced events are all that are prehended. How one event concresces
is prehended in another’s first phase. Phrasing the above statements with more commonly-known
terms: Physical phenomena are what are experienced. To be physical just is to cause. Likewise,
the immediate past is all that is experienced. The structure of a cause will manifest in the future it
brings about. This is the metaphysical basis for causal connection (along with many other things),
and though it may seem radical at first glance, we will see that the problems it solves are myriad.
Process and Causation
First, how does this metaphysical scheme address the three observations made in the
previous pages? The first – that basic experience extends far “lower” than just to humans or even
to other animals – is enriched even further by this metaphysics by postulating a panexperientialism.
All Process involves extremely basic experience. One might ask how our human experience is (by
intuition at least) relatively far richer, more complex, etc. than other animals, and the answer lies
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in the concept of nexus – another category of Whitehead’s to which I will give due diligence later.
The second – that causation must be able to admit experience if we are to be realists about
experience – is also clearly given its due. Not only is experience a possible effect of cause, but to
be affected just is to experience, on this metaphysical scheme. Third, Process metaphysics grounds
a notion of causation that lines up quite well with intuition. Just as common sense conceives of
causation as an event (largely) determining how the next one manifests, so Process metaphysics
gives this notion structure in the dyadic relation between actual occasions, where an actual
occasion prehends past events and assimilates them into its own dynamic manifestation.
Process and Time
I discussed in the last major section the relations among actual occasions as they pertain to
the phases of prehension and concrescence. But why the second phase, that of self-determination?
Why couldn’t reality be “static” such that all events are identical? Recall that this structure of
Process in fact embodies yet another concept – time. The actual occasion gives structure to the
becoming of the future out of the past, and therefore gives structure to time; the exact same
structure, in fact, as both causation and experience. Again, all three concepts are fundamentally
aspects of the same relation – grounded in this metaphysical structure, and simply instantiated
from different explanatory perspectives. If causation is Process as conceived of in terms of “causal
powers”, and experience is Process as conceived of in terms of an “experiencing subject”, then
what is time? I argue that time, as a concept, is the metrical abstraction of Process.
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To clarify further, let us consider Process philosophy’s answers to Zeno’s paradoxes 9
regarding time. After all, if we are attempting to give structure to time itself, we must satisfactorily
answer these kinds of pressing metaphysical problems. First, do we mean to say that an event has
infinitesimal duration? Or that an event has a set duration? Prima facie either one seems
problematic. Second, do we mean to say that the change from event to event is an infinitesimal
change? Or do the “event parameters” change by some set amount between events? To clarify:
when contemplating an event, one’s intuition is prone to visualize some tiny segment of – or point
on – a “timeline” wherein time is represented spatially, as physicists and other scientists are apt to
do, creating conditions for the possibility of imposing a metrical structure thereon – “geometrizing”
the concept of a measurable duration. This is the metrical abstraction of Process that is time. In
being able to measure duration, we as thinkers gained a valuable tool. However, this was at the
cost of taking the fundamentally dynamic and attempting to apply static labels – labels such as
ticks on a timeline. But once we shrug off the prejudice that renders us prone to want to spatialize
time, the concept of Process becomes clearer. Measuring duration caused us to abstract away the
dynamic as static; Process philosophy invites us to do the opposite – to take what we assume as
static and ground it back into dynamicism. Every “point” on a “timeline” is nothing more than the
active becoming of the future out of the past – a dynamic Process. With this basic assumption, it
becomes clear why there is no universal time to speak of, and why the subjective feeling of time
passing can vary wildly. It also answers Zeno directly. The question regarding the duration of an

Zeno’s paradoxes, first put forth by the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (ca. 495 – 430 B.C.E.), attempted to show
that plurality (in the spatial sense) and change (in the temporal sense) were illusory. The paradox is usually stated as:
Imagine a distance or duration. One must reach the halfway point of said distance or duration before one can reach
the end. This must be repeated for each consecutive half-distance or half-duration. But then it would seem that
before getting to the end of a “finite” distance or duration, one has moved infinitely through space, or infinitely
through time.
9
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event is a nonsensical question on the face of it, because Process cannot be spatialized.
“Infinitesimally long” only makes sense in a spatially visualized framework 10 . Likewise, the
concept of “amount of change from event to event” is logically and epistemically reduced to a
metrical abstraction, where change can only be conceived of as a comparison of one measurement
to another at different times. Not only does this presuppose the spatialization of time, but it also
confuses the comparative difference between two concresced occasions as they are measured with
the dynamic phase of self-determination mentioned earlier. If further clarification on how relations
could possibly ground relata is needed, I refer the reader to the extensive research done in Ontic
Structural Realism (Ladyman, et. al, 2007 [5]; Rickles and Landry, 2012 [6], etc.) and other
metaphysical theories that share this essential notion. In these theories, it is the relations
themselves (in the case of Process philosophy, the relations being essentially dynamic, understood
above by way of reciprocity) that are fundamental and serve to ground the measurable relata.
Process and Experience
Three more foreseeable questions remain: First, why does prehension necessarily need to
be experiential in nature? It is surely very similar to our conception of experience, but perhaps this
is our error. Perhaps, as an epiphenomenalist might posit, the prehension sans experience does all
of the explanatory work, and experience simply supervenes on prehension 11 . This objection
deserves a paper of its own, and thankfully, philosopher Anderson Weekes has already deigned to
write one. In his work Consciousness and Causation [8], he says,
[Whitehead] proposes that experience isn’t just a paradigm case of Process, but the key to
its essential structure. All Process involves the emergence of something ever so briefly

10
11

Presupposing of course a metrical space, i.e. the very mathematical principle of “geometrizing” an extension
See Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism or Something Near Enough [7].
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mind-like out of the physical, creating some modicum of both novelty and continuity
through an assimilation and accommodation between what already is and what is, more or
less creatively, just now becoming.
Weekes 427
Process metaphysics completely reconceptualizes experience, as panexperientialism has as its two
important consequences that experience is ubiquitous and real, but also that our own experience is
not as special as we would like to believe.
The Nexus
Even though I won’t develop further exposition of this category of Whitehead’s until later,
the question remains from earlier what a nexus is and how it solves the problem of answering at
once how our human experience is not as special as we usually conceive it to be, but also how it
is certainly far richer as compared to the experience of, say, a rock. In this chapter, I will outline
what is meant by a nexus of Process, and I will explain how it resolves this dilemma in Chapter 2.
At present, consider the concept of “nexus” in common parlance to be very similar to what
Whitehead has in mind, though not entirely. In Whitehead’s own words: “A nexus is a set of actual
entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions of each other, or – what is
the same thing conversely expressed – constituted by their objectifications in each other”
(Whitehead, PR, 24). This establishes that a nexus involves multiple actual occasions and is
defined primarily by their relatedness to one another. Furthermore, this relatedness takes on the
character of Process – that of causation, experience, and time as one, as exposited in the section
before. Whitehead submits a subcategory under the category of nexus, which he terms “society”.
A society is a nexus with a “defining characteristic”. What our normal experience lends us to
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perceive, therefore, are mostly societies. Objects, cells, molecules, etc. are all societies of actual
occasions, with a certain structure or defining characteristic. The line between societal nexus and
non-societal nexus is not a hard one. Likewise, any said defining characteristic will never capture
a nexus’s full structure, but such are the limits of language. Regardless, however, such a
subcategory “…serves to link [Whitehead’s] speculative conception of actual entities with entities
of ordinary experience, such as material bodies and living organisms (including cells and
molecules)” [9].
Process as Ground
Here there may be one final point of confusion or contention. Did we not introduce our
ontological primitive as a structured event? If so, then are there many of these events, all extended
in reality, relating to one another through time, space, etc.? Not necessarily. As James Bradley
writes in Whitehead and the Analysis of the Propositional Function [10]:
Contrary to … maintaining that … occasions are extensive, tiny little contents of the world,
I have argued … that the various categories of Whitehead’s theory of Process constitute a
new kind of transcendental analysis: they are transcendental conditions of actualization.
(As such, … occasions are not themselves extensive but are the conditions of extension.)
… Moreover, [Whitehead] can sidestep the debate between empiricists and Kantians on
the relative priority of time and causation, for both find their condition in the transcendental
recursive series [of Process].
Bradley 153-4
Process is not the metaphysical substructure of matter-energy and the causation it undergoes; it is
the modal and metaphysical substructure of reality itself; at least, any reality wherein time,
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causation, or experience are concepts that mean anything at all. In short, it is the metaphysical
substructure of an enormous amount of conceivable realities. Although this may seem a daring
claim, the philosophical problems and questions such an axiom can address are myriad.
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Chapter II.
Process Metaphysics as Applied to Various Domains of Inquiry
In Chapter I, I stated that I would address the eliminativist position on conscious experience.
I will first answer this thoroughly and in doing so explore what a philosophy of mind looks like
through the lens of this metaphysics, before moving on to other domains of inquiry, such as
psychology and even semantics. This exercise will set the stage for how to approach the subject of
metaethics.
First-Personhood of Conscious Experience
One of the most often-contested claims about consciousness by the eliminativists is that
consciousness involves a phenomenon which cannot be described or arrived at through thirdperson means – that is, the observation and reasoning thereon of scientific methodology12. Such a
claim is expressed in different ways, whether by way of David Chalmers’s original formulation of
the hard problem13, Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument14, or Thomas Nagel’s famous stipulation
about bats15. All three of these posit the phenomenon of first-person knowledge: knowledge that
cannot be arrived at without being oneself and only oneself. I will not delve into a defense of this
position, but it seems most philosophers who hold the hard problem to be a legitimate problem
consider this the crucial point. If detractors of this concept point to, as one of their reasons for

12

See, for instance, Daniel Dennett [11].
Again, how could the physical processes as described by science lead to the rich phenomenal experience of
consciousness?
14
The knowledge argument in philosophy of mind is a thought experiment involving Mary the color scientist who
has access to all possible third-person knowledge about color perception, but who has never seen color herself. One
day she is let out of her colorless lab and allowed to see a red rose. Does she learn anything new? [12]
15
Nagel famously argued that though one know everything there possibly is to know about a bat, one can never
know what it is like to be a bat. [13]
13
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denying it, the apparent fact that there is no grounding for such a phenomenon, Process philosophy
at least answers that qualm. A proposed solution is stated by, again, philosopher Anderson Weekes:
“Notice first of all that … experience, whether it is conscious or not, must be entirely a private
affair. An occasion can never be prehended by another before its own subjective enjoyment has
perished16, making the act (but not the object) of experience wholly private” (Weekes, CC, 447).
I believe that most of the argumentation between the eliminativists and the consciousness-realists
revolve around this point. Moreover, though the former traditionally have a legitimate point against
the latter in the nonexistence of an explanation for such first-personhood, Process metaphysics
gives us a straightforward ground for how such a phenomenon is possible.
In the introduction to this section, I promised to satisfy even the common assumptions
about consciousness which many philosophers of mind relegate to mistaken folk psychology. To
bolster this argument, I will be borrowing heavily from the great Process thinker David Griffin, in
his paper titled Consciousness as Subjective Form [14]. Griffin recalls that Whitehead
“endeavor[s] to interpret experience in accordance with the overpowering deliverance of common
sense” (Whitehead, PR, 50). What would these overpowering common-sense notions be? Griffin
lists four: “…that conscious experience exists, that it exerts an influence upon the body, that it has
a degree of self-determining freedom, and that it can act in accord with various norms” (Griffin,
CSF, 177). Let’s examine each of these in turn and discuss how Process philosophy elucidates an
explanation for each.

16

In other words, its own phases, especially prehension, have already played out. Furthermore, it is coherent to use
temporal language here given that this relation is also one of time itself, grounding the concresced occasion as past
and the prehending occasion as present-into-future.
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Ontological Status of Consciousness
As for how such consciousness is possible (i.e. the hard problem), the panexperientialism
inherent within Process metaphysics offers a satisfying answer. Griffin writes:
If we hold that neurons are sentient17, the insoluble problem of how conscious experience
could emerge out of insentient neurons does not arise. Even McGinn grants this point,
saying that if we could suppose neurons to have ‘proto-conscious states,’ it would be ‘easy
enough to see how neurons could generate consciousness’ (McGinn, 1991, 28n).
Griffin CSF 187
Recall the previous discussion on the concept of nexus. Consciousness is indeed a nexus, and
certainly a society. Its defining characteristic may be regarded as its inordinate complexity and
interrelatedness to both its immediate organismal body and its environment. Specifically, human
consciousness as a society also admits abstract thought as a defining characteristic. It should be
noted again, however, that there is no hard line between this kind of experiential society and the
experiential society of lesser organisms, or even non-life. There are only differences in the level
of complexity of the nexus therein, and the specific form they take. Process metaphysics therefore
offers a theory characterized by epistemic humility, bringing us and the world closer on the
ontological landscape. Not only do other organisms (and perhaps the machines we create) have a
complex experience rarely appreciated, but our fragile consciousness is not as exceptional as we
often believe it to be. Indeed, Process philosophy does answer the hard problem, but reframes
consciousness completely, forcing us to think differently about its relation to the world around us.

17

“Sentient” here meaning possessing experience, not possessing thought of some kind.
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Mental Causation
The second common sense assumption about consciousness is that it exerts an influence
upon the body. This is where most philosophers will attribute common sense to be mistaken.
However, Process philosophy gives us a framework to at least give this commonsensical notion its
due diligence, without appealing to dualist interactionism or some other counterintuitive
metaphysical notion. Instead, this assumption can be slightly modified so as to mesh with our
metaphysics here: consciousness is an integral and essential part of the causal chain that results in
(a significant portion of) bodily action. Recall that, in chapter 1, it was discussed how Process
philosophy could answer the “causal closure” objection. Griffin agrees, and elaborates:
Rather than, with materialists, thinking of billiard-ball collisions as paradigmatic [of
causation] or, with dualists, thinking in terms of two radically different kinds of causation
and then wondering how [they] can interact, panexperientialism conceives of all causation
as … analogous to the transference of feeling between two moments of our own experience.
Griffin CSF 188
It therefore follows that our conscious experience influences our body; indeed, experience is how
influence itself manifests.
Freedom of the Will
The third assumption is that we act with a degree of self-determining freedom. This, of
course, is built directly into Process metaphysics at its core. The second phase of all actual
occasions is creative self-determination.
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… [Whitehead] did not have to explain how our experience, with its great capacity for selfdetermination, could have arisen out of entities that interacted in a wholly deterministic
way. … Rather, compound individuals with increasingly more mentality emerged out of
ones with less.
Griffin CSF 188
The natural objection to this premise is the observation that even if, say, quantum mechanics were
truly nondeterministic, doesn’t physics normalize to determinism at a macroscopic scale? There
are two major points to consider here, without even delving into physics itself, per se. The first is
that Whitehead, like Peirce and James, was descriptionist rather than prescriptionist about “laws
of nature” such as those which would be described as deterministic. The second is that pattern,
such as that described by the “laws of nature” we have observed, has no quarrel with creative selfdetermination. Creativity – in this context meaning spontaneity, or true indeterminism – with no
pattern would be utter chaos, but if there were no creativity then time would simply not be what it
is. Reality is ever-changing, and though the present is forever closed to the past and future, the
latter boundary is constantly transcended to bring about new present moments, characterized by
actual occasions vis-à-vis an experiencing subject. Determinism postulates that these future events
are fully and completely determined, and that the only definite property they lack is being in the
present. Process philosopher Charles Hartshorne argues against those who would suggest that
“before events happen, they lack nothing except a totally transparent, featureless something called
‘occurrence’. To some of us this is truly an absurdity. If becoming does not create new quality and
quantity, … it creates nothing, and nothing ever really becomes” (Hartshorne, LP, 165) [15]. If,
along with Hartshorne, this seems absurd, one must be willing to affirm the opposite: that the
structure of time – the structure of Process – is creative in nature. In so affirming, it follows that
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an extremely complex, integrated society of Process like one’s conscious self would also be
creative in nature. Therefore, we have in hand a coherent explanation as to how our conscious self
could act with a degree of self-determining freedom.
The fourth assumption, recalling back to Griffin’s original listing, was that one can act in
accord with various norms. This is more accurately stated as: that consciousness can discern norms
with which one can act in accord. As this directly alludes to metaethics, a discussion on this
assumption will be tabled until chapter 3.
The Modern View
Before applying Process thought to a few more domains of inquiry, there is one more
assumption about consciousness, not mentioned by Griffin, to which Process philosophy gives a
satisfactory answer. The modern view of consciousness, that of a subjective “container” into and
from which experiential “contents” are put and discarded moment-to-moment, raises some
peculiar metaphysical questions indeed. For instance, “… how can consciousness be conscious of
(i.e. “contain”) matter? … Or, how can consciousness be conscious of the past, that is, how can
the present (present consciousness) contain the past?” (Weekes, CC, 453). On traditional
metaphysical models, these are simply intractable. The first seems to restrict one to
phenomenalism – as clearly consciousness can only ever perceive or discern the phenomenal
properties of matter and never it as it is – and the second cannot possibly occur, by definition of
present and past. On a Process view, however, these are readily answered. Consciousness can
clearly be conscious of matter, if we take consciousness to mean experience and matter to mean
physical reality as it manifests efficient causation. The experienced simply is the physical cause,
and the physical effect simply is the experience. And the past? This, too, follows directly. Once
again, to be “in the past” is to be concresced and therefore able to be prehended. The immediate
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past is in fact all that experience can directly relate to. So, this modern view of consciousness,
while it does not capture the essence of what consciousness is, should not be misconstrued as
misguided or unmotivated. I qualify my point here to remind the reader that even all that exposition
comes nowhere close to a summary of the literature on Process philosophy of mind. It is hopefully
enough, however, to serve our purposes looking ahead into our metaethical questions.
Process and the Self
Let us briefly touch on just a couple more domains of inquiry on which Process philosophy
can comment valuably, and which will help in our discussions of metaethics – namely, personhood
and semantics. Both will undoubtedly prove instrumental regarding the upcoming metaethical
issues. To analyze these issues, I will be standing on the shoulders of yet another great Process
thinker, Nicholas Rescher, and his 2003 work The Promise of Process Philosophy [16]. Let us start
with personhood – that is, answering the question “what does it mean to be a person?” Since this
specific question usually carries considerable ethical baggage, perhaps we can first answer the
question “what does it mean to be me?” That is, what is the self? David Hume was skeptical of the
substantival view of the self, as he writes in Treatise of Human Nature, Part II [17]:
From what impression could this idea be derived? … For my part, when I enter most
intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or
other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Hume THN2 [Appx]
Hume is correct here, though the substantival dualist would argue that of course the self can never
be perceived since it is the perceiver, and therefore the substantial self’s existence must always be
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inferred rather than observed. Descartes’s first move epistemically was to attempt just this by
famously stating “cogito, ergo sum”. I argue that Descartes got this move only slightly wrong.
Instead of an induction from a coherent yet complex process of thinking and experiencing to a
substantial, unitary “self”, the latter is an abstraction from the former. However, Process
philosophy does not wish to dissolve the self into obsolescence. On the contrary, rather than being
unitary in substance, the self is instead unified in the societal nexus of mind. Rescher elaborates:
Once we conceptualize the core “self” of a person as a bundle of actual and potential
processes … then we have a concept of personhood that renders the self or ego
experientially accessible, seeing that experiencing itself simply consists of the exercise of
such processes18. In a Process-oriented approach, the self or ego (the constituting core of a
person as such, that is, as the particular person he or she is) is simply a megaprocess – a
structured system of processes,19 a cohesive and (relatively) stable center of agency.
Rescher PPP 58
Perhaps there could still be pushback against the idea that the self could be constituted by a nexus
of Process – that this concept deflates the notion of a self to the point that it is nearly meaningless.
But this is not so. Consider an analogy put forth by Evan Thompson in his Waking, Dreaming,
Being [18], where he analogizes what he calls the “mind-body aggregate” (or, more accurately on
our theory, one’s cognitive processes) to a mirror and the self to an image therein:
The self is like an image in a mirror. The image depends for its existence on the mirror –
the mirror is the basis for the image – but the image isn’t one and the same thing as the

18
19

Recall that experience-experienced is one of the fundamental relations involved in all Process.
This is clearly similar to the previously-exposited Whiteheadian nexus and, in this case, society.
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mirror, nor is it made of the same stuff as the mirror, for as an image it exists only in
relation to an observer. The mirror image, though mind dependent, isn’t a subjective
illusion. Nevertheless, the way that the self appears does involve an illusion … The illusion
– or delusion – is taking the self to have an independent existence, like taking the mirror
image to be really in the mirror.
Thompson WDB 364
If calling the essence of a person a societal nexus of Process – when I have given molecules
and cells as examples of societies as well – seems demeaning in some way, as if our personal
livelihood were no different in kind (or no more important, even!) than the life cycle of a
mitochondria, it should be noted that Process philosophy is decidedly nonreductionist. The
metaphysical structure is the same with regards to all “levels” of nature, and there is no “privileged
level” upon which all other levels are grounded. For instance, it would be a mistake to say that a
human being is the way they are simply in virtue of all of their particles being the way they are.
Likewise, it would be a mistake to say that a human being is the way they are simply in virtue of
the universe being the way it is. Recall, again,20 that Process is not extended in space and time, but
rather the condition for the possibility of extension. Accordingly, metrical size is a result, rather
than a contributing parameter, of a society of Process. The causal-experiential structure is the only
characteristic of note. This can be analyzed at multiple levels, and though the metaphysics holds
true at all levels, no one level is privileged above the rest. It makes perfect sense to talk about the
nexus of an atom and, in the same breath, refer to the nexus of a galactic supercluster. That being
said, it is clear to see that the causal-experiential structure of the human brain is unlike any other
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organism that we as of yet know of in terms of its richness and depth. Its ability to think, imagine,
consciously choose, etc., are what set it apart in terms of its defining characteristics. In this way,
the very fact that both human persons and complex molecules are societies of Process should not
be a cause to doubt human beings’ exceptional place in the world.
Process Semantics
I move to the final point of setup before introducing the metaethical scheme, and that is
semantics. One of the fundamental suppositions of our metaphysical scheme here is that the
dynamicism of Process is fundamental and grounds any object- or substance-based ontology that
we might want to construct. Therefore, a more accurate semantics than our heavily noun-based
common English would be one centered around dynamic process. What this would entail would
be changing all nouns to gerunds and all adjectives to adverbs. This particular transformation of
semantics was in fact suggested by Donald Davidson [19]. For instance, in traditional subjectpredicate semantics, one encounters the problem of nonexistent individuals. Rescher recalls the
example, first put forward by Gottlob Frege [20], of connoting ‘Pegasus’ with the predicate
‘winged horse’: “Pegasus is a winged horse”. But how is this statement to make any sense, when
neither exist? “How are we then to avert the awkward consequence that the truistic premise
‘winged horse (Pegasus)’ does not yield the patently false conclusion ‘(∃x) x is a winged horse’?”
(Rescher, PPP, 62). The answer is to convert the statement to a Process semantics: “Pegasizing is
winged-horsing” or, more, precisely, “Pegasizing instantiates the processual structure of winged
horsing”. And we can clarify by saying that for all existence, no Pegasizing is occurring. 21 In
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I will in fact argue against Rescher on a minor point, which is that a Process semantics should be accompanied
by spatial positioning in order to indexicalize a certain process. Instead, such indexes ought to be relational in
nature, relying on the ontological category of nexus rather than the nebulous concept of absolute position in
space.
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Rescher’s words, “In general, a Process semantics must accomplish with verbs and adverbs what
a semantics of individuals accomplishes with properties and relations. When the one says, ‘X has
the property F’ the other says, ‘X functions F-ly’” (Rescher, PPP, 64). While Process semantics
does not presume itself a panacea to all semantical problems, it is a compelling part of Process
methodology in analyzing a given problem, question, or set of premises. I argue in the next chapter
that it is particularly invaluable at dissecting the semantics of morality.
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Chapter III
Process Metaphysics and the Ontological Status of Moral Value
Given such a metaphysical theory, how are we to make sense of the ontology of ethics?
Certainly, there are concerns in metaethics that do not entail a recourse to metaphysics – however,
a comprehensive metaphysics should be able to inform one’s metaethical theorizing in principle
and in practice. Debates concerning the semantics of moral statements can be informed by a
Process semantics. Debates between realism and antirealism more generally can be informed by
the more fundamental aspects of Process ontology, while debates concerning methodology of
discernment can be informed by the Process concept of nexus. We will analyze each of these
debates in turn and see where the clarifications offered by Process philosophy lead, on the
metaethical landscape.
Process and Moral Statements
The first question that a metaethical theory should be able to answer is, “What do people
mean when they utter a moral statement?” This question can be analyzed in different ways, both
purely semantically and with regards to what exactly the referents in such a statement are. Consider
the first: applying Process semantics to a simple moral statement such as “Killing is wrong” is
quite straightforward. We can transform this into “Killing is acting wrongly”, or, more precisely,
“The set of processes characterized by ‘killing’ is within the set of processes characterized by
‘acting wrongly’”. These characterizations, as said before, pertain to causal-experiential structure.
Whether or not one agrees with this final statement, it is a far more clearly annunciated claim,
which can be analyzed further. But the original, untransformed statement here already implies
dynamic action and so naturally lends itself to Process semantics. What about one which deals
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with (allegedly static) situations? Consider the statement “My situation is good”. In Process
semantics, this becomes “Situation-ing I-ly is acting well”. While this seems nonsensical, it need
not be. It may make more sense to say, “Happenings directly related to the society ‘me’22 are
happening well”. In other words, to describe one’s situation as good is to describe the structure of
the processes acting upon oneself 23 . The error in the original statement is conceptualizing a
situation as, again, a point in time – an indexable thing with a property, rather than a set of everdynamic processes with relational structure as pertaining to other processes. A third case of moral
statement might be when things, and not acts or situations, are described as immoral. For example:
“Pornography is immoral”. In Process semantics, this becomes “Pornography-ing is acting
immorally”. Unfortunately, in this statement, we can see that we are left with much ambiguity.
What exactly does one mean by “pornography-ing”? One cannot mean any and every process
involving the ‘thing’ itself, or that would admit deleting it, burning it, etc. And surely the person
making such a statement would want to say that those actions are good. He or she would need to
qualify quite a lot in order to make this statement precise when transformed to a Process semantics.
For instance, “Creating pornography is immoral”. This would become “Pornography-creating is
acting immorally”. This, like the first example, is simple to parse and analyze further.
Why is this type of transformation a valuable tool? In each case, the moral characteristic is
normalized to an adverb. If it can’t be, the statement is ambiguous and in need of further
qualification. This has potentially wide-reaching implications. First, we can easily see why some
have perceived the is-ought gap 24 to be unbridgeable. For those who have looked for moral
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Recall the Process view of the self.
We can also put this statement into far more precise set theoretic terms, as we did for the first example, but this
somewhat less precise structure serves our purposes well enough.
24
A term made famous by David Hume, sometimes referred to as “Hume’s Guillotine”. Hume attempted to show that
one could never, even in principle, get from a set of descriptive statements to a normative one. That is, that one cannot
induce moral value from observation.
23
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properties within the realm of things, the moral character of events was sure to be elusive, as we
illustrated with the third example in the preceding paragraph. Attempting to situate morality in a
primarily thing or substance-based ontology was almost surely a venture to prove itself a nonstarter. We can even construct a relatively straightforward error theory as to why this happens. For
instance, one can say that a certain pornographic image is tan in color, and one can say that the
image is immoral. However, though it makes sense to convert the first into Process semantics –
“Emitting photons that-image-ly is emitting photons tan-ly” – we have already discussed why the
second does not transform coherently. This is because, though the processual characterization of
color is straightforward and known in full by science, the processual characterization of morality
is not straightforward at all and hardly agreed upon by philosophers. This is no accident, of course.
It is extremely likely that such a simple statement (“That image is immoral”) cannot be transformed
into Process semantics and stay coherent at the same time. But this is not necessarily a particular
issue produced or delivered for Process semantics per se – it is instead an issue with lack of
qualification and therefore obscurity of meaning. The same problem obtains with simple
descriptive statements, if one presupposes a substantival ontology. Consider: “Roller coasters
increase one’s heart rate”. Surely the analogy is clear – one must qualify with regards to riding
them, designing them, looking up at them, etc. It is no small consideration that any moral speech
which takes this basic form, and the theorizing based on it, commits this fundamental error.
Process and Consequence
As follows naturally from our metaphysical scheme, moral properties, if they exist, must
exist as properties – here meaning aspects of relational structure – of dynamic processes, and not
as properties that singular things or situations could have. One direct result of this paradigm shift
is that, demonstrated in the second example earlier, it is a mistake to conceive of situations as
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having inherent value; they therefore cannot be the grounding for the ethicality of action. Consider
the Process semantical transformation of a simple consequentialist25 statement such as, “Flipping
the switch is good because the resultant situation if I do will be better than the alternative”. Our
transformation gives, “This instance of switch-flipping is acting ethically. Said ethicality is
grounded in the ethicality of the situation-ing resulting from said switch-flipping, as compared to
the ethicality of the situation-ing resulting from non-switch-flipping”. But it is quite clear that this
creates an infinite regress. If a property of processes now is always grounded in the same property
of processes at some time in the future, this pushes the grounding relation infinitely into the future.
This is untenable, and so the ground for morality must be found elsewhere.
Realism vs Antirealism
Whether morality is a property of things or processes, the main issues of metaethics still
obtain: What does one mean by the good? Is it an abstract ideal, best likened to a Platonic Form?
Is it a real property in the external world, just like electrical charge or distance? Or is it a
constructed concept, useful to humans in societal configurations but ultimately supervenient upon
– or even nonexistent within – the best description of the physical world? Or could moral properties
simply be ascriptions of disfavor by uniquely human minds, projecting emotion or something close
thereto upon the world? All of these views could, in principle, incorporate Process philosophy’s
stress upon dynamicism rather than staticity. However, there is one which coheres the best with
the specific metaphysical scheme offered here.

25

Consequentialism in ethics is a broad camp that attempts to ground the ethicality of a given action in how much net
good it will bring about, i.e. the best action is the one that produces the best consequences. The meaning of the term
“consequences” here can be further clarified as two or more different resultant situations at some future time t, one of
which will (likely or certainly) come about as a direct result of a certain action now.
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I start by addressing the second question here: “Are moral properties and physical
properties such as electrical charge alike in their ontological status?” To be able to approach this,
we must recall what Process philosophy has to say about physical properties, which is that they
are a stable pattern of dynamic structure. A red pigment is not red because it has some “essence”
which makes it so26. It is rather red because the process of photons absorbing into and/or reflecting
upon the pigment is relatively stable such that those reflected predominate in the “red” part of the
electromagnetic spectrum. To answer the rejoinder questioning if that pigment were to stay red
even if no photon were to ever hit it again is to emphasize that such properties are dispositional
and thus counterfactual-supporting. The Process answer would be that in that case, at least as it
pertains to the pigment, the word “red” has lost all meaning – as the ascription’s referent is an
actual relational predicate, hence indexed in a particular context, denoting a particular process –
and so such a statement will as well. But this in fact elucidates an important observation: If morality
is a property of processes involving humans27, then Process philosophy can confidently say that if
no humans were around, then the morality we refer to would cease to carry any meaning. This
assessment eliminates a few of the more fundamentally realist positions in morality regarding the
ontological status of norms (such as the Neo-Platonism alluded to in the first question before).
Even with this formulation, morality so conceived as a normative dimension concerning particular
societies (in the Process metaphysical sense) is as real or actual as any nexus, even if that existence
is contingent upon human interaction. But, on the other hand, the processes able to be referred to
by moral concepts can only arise in relation to human experience, lending seeming credence to the
noncognitivists’ claims regarding morality as an expression and projection of feeling.

As in the case of Moliere’s satirical example of “dormitive virtue” as the explanatory principle for a sleeping potion.
I of course want to tell an evolutionary story here, so I do not doubt whatsoever that less cognitively complex
animals have a kind of proto-morality. However, here we are focusing on humanity and what we mean by “moral”.
26
27
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Sensibility Theory
The relevant question to ask, then, is this: are these two options in fact mutually exclusive,
as they first appear to be? I will argue that they are not, and that there exists a well-illustrated
theory which meshes extremely well with Process philosophy and its commitments both to realism
and the efficacy of experience. On the views of the sensibility theorists such as John McDowell
and David Wiggins, the editors of Moral Discourse and Practice [21] write:
[These thinkers] have drawn inspiration from the idea that normative or evaluative
judgments might bear some analogy to … judgments essentially tied to the exercise of
certain human sensibilities.
…
Noncognitivism has, in their view, rightly stressed the contribution of sentiment to moral
judgment, but wrongly forced such judgments into the mold of expressive projection.
Intuitionism has, again in their view, rightly stressed the cognitive aspects of value
judgment, but wrongly forced such judgments into the mold of detecting a special realm of
independently existing properties.
…
McDowell made possible a significant innovation within … cognitivism by showing …
[that] the very sensibility that gives individuals the capacity to discern these sensibilitytied properties could, he urged, necessarily involve possession of certain affective or
conative propensities.
Darwall et al MDP 20
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The above quote contains many themes to consider. Firstly, what is moral sensibility theory?
Though a myriad of works on sensibility theory have been written, I will attempt to give a brief
summary here. Sensibility theory proposes that moral properties are largely dependent upon a
feature of human minds known as a moral sensibility. The relation goes the other way, such that a
moral sensibility is a human’s capacity to perceive moral properties in the world. If this seems ad
hoc, let us use humor as a direct analogy28. To describe something as humorous would make no
sense whatsoever if humans did not exist. Likewise, if humor did not exist then not only would
there be nothing by which a sense of humor is affected, but also statements such as “That was
funny!” would be meaningless. The sensibility theorists see great potential within this analogy and
others like it. As discussed in the previous quote, this scheme preserves moral meaning’s heavy
dependence on human experience, both generally and to each particular event as it arises. However,
it preserves in full the cognitive content of moral statements. How does it do this? Consider again
the humor analogy and imagine there exists an individual bereft of a sense of humor completely.
Could said person still take the statements “Every joke comedian A tells is funny” and “Joke X is
a joke comedian A tells” and deduce the conclusion “Therefore, joke X is funny”? Absolutely.
And this is sound logical deduction (if a bit far-fetched in reality). In just the same way, sensibility
theory avoids all of the semantic problems that have long fraught noncognitivism, such as the
Frege-Geach Problem29, and so distinguishes itself as a theory which attempts to give due diligence
to expression and/or sentiment and yet stay fully cognitive.
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This analogy is used by McDowell; unfortunately, as his illustration of this analogy is quite verbose and lengthy, I
decided to paraphrase here.
29
The Frege-Geach Problem (put forth in [22]) is a problem for noncognitivism which demonstrates how different
replacements of moral statements in different ways (such as “Boo! X” or “I don’t like X”) cannot be true replacements,
as moral statements can figure into logical deductions, formalized like any other. For instance, “If X is wrong, then Y
is also wrong. X is wrong. Therefore, Y is also wrong” would collapse when these statements are transformed into the
“Boo! X” form. The deduction is no longer logically valid and so this cannot be what we are really saying when we
make moral statements.
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Process Metaethics
Perhaps there is a concern that this explanation is circular. That is, if an event is ethical in
virtue of human moral sensibility discerning it negatively, and a certain human sensibility is a
moral one in virtue of its discerning the ethicality of events, this seems to create problems. As
Darwall et al write, “A peg that fits a round hole has a particular shape; so does a hole that fits a
square peg; but what shape in particular do an otherwise unspecified peg and hole have thanks to
the fact that they fit each other?” (Darwall et al, MDP, 21). However, on our metaphysical scheme,
this problem can be easily resolved, because it manifests the exact same structure as the hard
problem. Said another way, “An experience resulting from an unethical event has a particular
structure; so does the cause of a negative moral sensibility experience; but what shape in particular
do an otherwise unspecified experience and cause have thanks to the fact that they fit each other?”
This is akin to asking, “What form does mental/physical interaction take?” Once again, our
metaphysical scheme is able to reframe and solve this problem easily. The phenomenon itself is a
unified process; it is only our cognitive biases that tempt us to frame either side as a separate thing,
i.e. unethicality as a cause of some experience or other and negative moral sensibility as an
experience of some cause or other. Once again, we have fallen into the trap of conceiving the relata
as the grounding for the relation rather than the other way around. Just as causation, experience,
and time are abstractions birthed from different explanatory perspectives on the more fundamental
metaphysical ground of dynamic and relational Process, so too ethicality and moral sensibility are
the physical and mental – i.e. causal and experiential – abstractions from the underlying valueladen Process which connects humanity to the world. On this account, our metaethics is still realist,
because to say a given event is unethical is to say that the relation between that event and the world
of human experience is laden with negative value. This perspective directly solves the peg-and-
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hole dilemma by allowing the relation between peg and hole itself do the explanatory work. No
reference need be made to purely abstract things such as shapes. One can describe how the system
really changes as one fits the pieces together, and their dynamic relation within the process. This
dynamic relation, and not the abstracted, static “shape” property, is what grounds their “fitting
together in such and such a way”. So, too, the causal-experiential relation between event and moral
sensibility just is the ground for value we are looking for. Similarly, the causal-experiential relation
between delivering a joke and eliciting a laugh is where humor will be found. Neither concept can
be found in the mind or the world, for both are instantiated in the relation between the two. We
can now freely discuss events as being ethical or unethical, as long as we keep in mind that, just
like in talking about causation, experience, or time as concepts in isolation, this concept (that of
an event having objective moral value devoid of relation to human experience) is an abstraction
from the true relational ground of value.
We now have in hand an ontological ground for moral value. But the question of “What do
we mean by morality?” does not only admit ontological grounding as an interpretation. It also
admits what might be called the practical meaning of the term; that is, people generally use the
term to what end? Most people have not pondered on the ontological status of moral value, but
they use normative statements every day. It might even be argued that, outside academic circles,
this is the only meaningful definition of the word. This is still within the realm of metaethics,
though it incorporates semantics and even empirical linguistic considerations. I will take for
granted that – whatever precise meaning it may carry for each person – there is a special character
to something being moral, and that is that it greatly affects one’s conscious action. One also expects
an action being moral or immoral to greatly affect others’ conscious actions in the same way. This
is, in fact, what McDowell argues is a salient piece of sensibility theory as opposed to other
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theories: If human moral sensibility is tied intimately together with the conscious, motivational
reasoning of our minds, it could be said that one property of moral sensibility itself is that it has
the capacity to elicit a conative response different in kind than other motives – a conative response
having to do with instantiating/furthering such an event as is experienced, or refraining from
instantiating/halting such an event 30. To follow the humor analogy, the humor sensibility (one’s
sense of humor) has the capacity to elicit a response like laughter, or at least a rise in one’s spirits.
What is so perspicuous about this observation is that, because humans have the capacity to imagine
performing a certain action before acting, we can experience such imagined actions and our moral
sensibility can then elicit a conative response thereon. This is one way in which moral sensibility
differentiates itself from simple impulsive motivation.
Within such a framework, we can detail a story about one’s practical utterances about
morality. When one hears about a given action by an agent and declares, “That was wrong”, the
following is, on our Process view, what is at play: First, the statement can be better said in Process
semantics: “Acting just like that was acting unethically”. The referent is a complex action and the
claim is that that action’s causal-experiential structure was unethical in nature. Transforming the
statement further via the sensibility theoretic relation31, that action’s causal-experiential structure
was such as to produce moral disapproval in humans with a developed moral sensibility. (Recall
that both facets – the unethicality and the moral response – are grounded in the value relation
between the action and human experience more generally.) The latter part of such a statement
implies that that action’s structure was such as to produce moral disapproval in the agent him or

I am tempted to go out on a limb and say that this conative response is exactly what we refer to when we say “virtue”,
though I will table that discussion for another day.
31
It is of utmost import to note here that this transformation is for practical purposes. One or the other side of this
transformation is no more or less accurate, true, etc. than the other. Discussing the ethicality of an action without
referring to moral sensibilities can be perfectly coherent.
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herself, given both that the agent had imagined the action prior to taking it, and that the agent has
a developed moral sensibility. So, we see that the crux of such a statement has in fact a lot to do
about responsibility, right down at the simple linguistic level. What one is implying with such a
statement is that the agent either did not think before he or she acted or did not have a developed
moral sensibility, or perhaps manifested moral disapproval which was overshadowed by other
motivational influences. So, the sensibility account makes clear some important distinctions in
ethical responsibility as well.
Process and Particularism
There is, as I can foresee, one significant charge against this account, which I will address
before concluding. That charge is found in Darwall et al, stated as:
Moreover, though there may be something to the idea of a “Gestalt” of value or
obligatoriness when we experience certain simple and familiar cases, when we face more
complex or novel moral questions where multiple tradeoffs and aggregation are involved,
it looks as if any experienced “attraction” or “must” will be the result of a complex
deliberation, not something that straightforwardly guides judgment. … the blending of
moral considerations may yet yield a judgment that a certain policy or course of action is
best, or most just, but not thanks to any irresistible qualitative state to which one can attend
closely and that guides judgment.
Darwall et al MDP 42
In other words, what methodology of discernment does this metaethics offer? It seems that most
of what we actually do when contemplating complex situations is reason using moral principles.
How can such principled reasoning mesh with a metaethics that, however realist, seems to be based
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in some important ways on phenomenology? The answer here lies with the larger metaethical camp
that Process metaethics finds itself within: moral particularism. I will not here give moral
particularism a proper, in-depth defense, but I will provide a brief definition. Moral particularism’s
main claim is that moral principles are not where ethics is grounded; instead, the moral features of
each unique event are particular to that event, hence particularism. How the scheme as I have laid
it out entails moral particularism is straightforward. If value is grounded in the relation of each
event to the world of human experience as it pertains to moral sensibility, it would follow that the
ethicality of each event is also particular. If this is true, it would entail that, at best, moral principles
are “crutches” of a sort for moral reasoning. They may still hold true in an abstract, statistical sense,
however. One’s statement of “Killing is wrong” can be just as true as “Dogs have four legs”.
Clearly, there are poor dogs who have lost a leg but are still obviously dogs. However, the
statement holds true in an abstract, statistical sense. In the same way, there are certainly ethical
forms of killing, e.g. shooting a would-be mass murderer, but the vast majority of killing is indeed
wrong; and so, the principle also holds true in the same fashion.
So how do we arrive at such moral principles and weed out which ones are bad for
reasoning? I would argue that these are arrived at through a methodology of moral experience and
education (using one’s moral sensibility) coupled with reflective equilibrium 32 . The moral
principles at which we arrive through this methodology are extremely useful for analyzing such
complex situations as this charge alludes to, and this is why we use them. Breaking down an event
into all of its particular features – isolating causes, variables, effects, motives, etc. is utterly
impractical for making ethical decisions in the real world. And so moral particularism has no
quarrel with the methodology commonly used today – that of weighing moral principles. However,

32

See [23] for an illustration of this topic.

39
in a meta-ethical sense it should be noted that the reality of moral value can only be found in
actuality, in the relation of each action’s ethicality to a developed human moral sensibility.
Conclusion
The ambition of this thesis is well understood. I have attempted to not only detail a Process
metaphysics that heavily borrows from A. N. Whitehead and others, but also differs from them in
important ways. I have attempted to show how this metaphysics grounds the different aspects of
reality, and which aspects are more fundamental to others. I have attempted to scale up this
metaphysical scheme and apply its axioms to different domains of inquiry, such as consciousness,
the self or personhood, and semantics. Finally, I used this same method to approach metaethics,
and found my scheme to mesh quite nicely with important aspects of the sensibility theory of
McDowell and others, though, again, there are important differences. I conclude not only that this
simplified, yet bolder version of Process metaphysics is true – insofar as a metaphysical theory
can be true – but also that it can solve a myriad of problems in multiple philosophical areas of
inquiry, including being able to ground moral value in a satisfying manner.
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